Legislative Reform on Post-Tenure Restrictions for Judges in the Maldives

A significant amendment to the Judges Act has been proposed and endorsed by the government through submission by PNC lawmaker Saudulla Hilmy, representing North Thinadhoo Constituency.

The amendment introduces a mandatory cooling-off period for former judges before they can appear in court as advocates, in a move aimed at upholding judicial integrity and preventing conflicts of interest.

The amendment introduces an ethical framework aligning the Maldives with judicial conduct norms observed in various democracies. For instance, in India, under the Bar Council of India Rules, former Supreme Court and High Court judges are prohibited from practicing law before the benches on which they served. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the Judiciary and Courts (Scotland) Act 2008 encourages retired judges to refrain from advocacy altogether, particularly where it may undermine judicial impartiality. Canada also maintains a strong convention—if not explicit statutory prohibition—that former judges should avoid advocacy roles, particularly in superior courts, to preserve public trust. These practices are intended to insulate judicial authority from conflicts of interest and to prevent the perception that judicial power can be leveraged post-tenure. From this perspective, the Maldivian amendment reflects a convergence with best practices, particularly in small jurisdictions where relationships between the bench and bar are often close and politically sensitive.

Despite its normative alignment with international standards, the proposed amendment may be perceived as politically motivated. The timing and framing of the legislation have raised concerns that it is designed to target high-profile justices who were recently expelled or pressured to resign from the Supreme Court, particularly under politically contentious circumstances. Notably, several judges who exited the judiciary amidst executive-judiciary confrontations in recent years have sought to re-establish themselves as legal practitioners or public figures. This legislation, while framed as a general reform, disproportionately affects such individuals—raising questions of selective enforcement and political reprisal.

This perception mirrors cases in Pakistan, where judicial reforms and references under Article 209 of the Constitution have at times been viewed as mechanisms for sidelining dissident or non-compliant judges. In Turkey, sweeping judicial purges post-2016 also introduced professional restrictions under the guise of reform, but were widely seen as consolidatory moves by the executive. The risk in the Maldivian context is that this amendment, while structurally valid, could erode confidence in judicial independence if perceived as retroactively punitive rather than forward-looking.

The proposed amendment carries several far-reaching implications. From an ethical standpoint, it reinforces structural safeguards to prevent undue influence and helps preserve judicial impartiality and courtroom integrity after a judge’s departure from office. Professionally, the legislation necessitates a shift for affected individuals, who must seek alternative legal roles—such as consultancy, academia, or arbitration—during the two-year cooling-off period, potentially interrupting or redefining their career paths. Public perception will be a critical factor; while the amendment is designed to enhance credibility and trust in the judiciary, inconsistent or politically motivated enforcement could undermine its legitimacy and be seen as a tool of expediency. Furthermore, the judiciary may interpret the amendment as a deterrent to dissent or independence, especially if enacted alongside other coercive reforms, potentially threatening the institutional autonomy essential to a healthy democratic system.

The amendment to the Judges Act represents a substantial institutional reform with the potential to bring Maldives in line with global standards on judicial conduct. However, its credibility hinges on the neutrality of its enforcement. Without transparent application and clear non-retroactive provisions, the law risks being viewed not as a tool for judicial reform, but as a targeted strike against politically inconvenient judges. As such, while the legal architecture is defensible, its political implications must be carefully managed to preserve both the rule of law and judicial independence